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Diplomacy and Statecraft Book Review 
 
Kevin Ruane and Matthew Jones, Anthony Eden, Anglo-American Relations and the 1954 
Indochina Crisis (London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2019). viii + 337pp. £85.00 hb. ISBN 
978-1-3500-2117-4. 
 
Kevin Ruane and Matthew Jones are two of Britain’s pre-eminent historians of Anglo-
American relations, nuclear weapons, and the Cold War in Southeast Asia. Consequently, this 
collaborative monograph has been long overdue. While the 1954 Indochina Crisis has 
received significant historical attention, the focus has overwhelmingly been on American 
actions and perspectives. Yet Ruane and Jones have re-examined the origins, course and 
aftermath of the Indochina Crisis through an original lens: the role played by British Foreign 
Secretary Anthony Eden – at the height of his diplomatic powers before his disastrous 
handling of the Suez Crisis two years later – against the backdrop of Anglo-American 
relations and the advent of the thermonuclear age. Moreover, the analysis they present is 
convincingly demonstrated through meticulous use of British and American official records, 
private papers collections, and published primary and secondary sources. In addition, this 
monograph is written in a style accessible to both scholars and a broader audience interested 
in the history of the Cold War and crisis management. 
 
More specifically, Ruane and Jones support the commonly-held argument presented by 
Eden’s biographers and historians of the 1954 Geneva Conference that ‘Eden’s 1954 
Indochinese diplomacy…was unquestionably the “glittering success” of Eden’s annus 
mirabilis’ (p. 255). The authors, therefore, portray Eden as a courageous figure who stood up 
against Washington’s very real plans to intervene in Indochina through ‘united action’ with 
Britain, and who instead worked shrewdly and successfully to find a diplomatic solution at 
the Geneva Conference. Nonetheless, Ruane and Jones add great nuance to this narrative. 
They bring to light new evidence of Eden’s suspicions of maintaining too close ties to the 
United States and his over-riding fear of a thermonuclear war – with Britain as the Soviet 
Union’s primary target – brought about by the brinkmanship of US Secretary of State John 
Foster Dulles, with whom Eden had acrimonious relations. The authors aptly describe these 
factors as ‘an interpretive Rosetta Stone helping decipher the determinants of British policy’ 
(p. 257). Furthermore, by placing the Indochina Crisis within the context of Britain’s longer-
term policy towards the region, this book demonstrates that the Foreign Secretary was 
reacting pragmatically to events in 1954 and that before this ‘Eden possessed no Indochina 
policy worth its name’ (p. 10). Still, the strategy that Eden came to adopt with regard to 
Indochina was a tried and tested one: a weak Britain exercising ‘power-by-proxy’ by 
convincing Washington to take responsibility for the defence of Southeast Asia. At the same 
time Eden sought to bring about ‘dual containment’ through a collective security organisation 
that would deter both Communist aggression and American adventurism. 
 
These arguments are coherently developed through sixteen chronological chapters. Chapters 
two to five provide a succinct account of the developments in Indochina and internationally 
between October 1951, when Eden was reinstated as Churchill’s Foreign Secretary in the 
newly-elected Conservative government, and the start of the crisis year of 1954. In particular, 
Ruane and Jones stress that the discussions at the December 1953 Bermuda Conference – at 
which Eisenhower and Dulles firmly indicated their willingness to use nuclear weapons if 
China intervened in Korea – were fresh in Eden’s mind when he formulated a response to the 
Indochina Crisis. Still, chapter six stresses that it was only with the beginning of the French 
failure at Dien Bien Phu that Eden placed his hopes in finding a diplomatic solution at the 
Geneva Conference while chapter seven emphasises Washington’s genuine desire for ‘united 
action’. In the next three chapters, then, the focus is on the various unsuccessful attempts by 
Eisenhower and Dulles to cajole the British into supporting their military plans. It was during 
this period that relations between Eden and Dulles reached breaking point leading to the 
American writing privately that Eden had double-crossed and lied to him. Chapters eleven 
and twelve discuss the opening stages of the Geneva Conference, against the backdrop of the 
final Vietminh military victory, tracing the continued tensions between Eden and Dulles 
before the latter’s departure. The following three chapters consider the United States’ 
deliberations regarding use of nuclear weapons, and the near collapse of Eden’s diplomatic 
efforts, before the Foreign Secretary, working closely with his Soviet counterpart, 
Vyacheslav Molotov, brought about the signing of the Geneva Accords. Lastly, the final two 
substantive chapters cover the achievement of Eden’s ultimate goal, the creation of the 
Southeast Asian Treaty Organisation (SEATO) with American backing, as well as provide a 
brief account of the events in Indochina after 1954 and the failure to implement the Geneva 
Accords. 
 
My criticisms of this monograph, therefore, are few and limited. To begin with, it would have 
been interesting to read more about Eden’s relationship with the French government and 
Paris’ perspectives of Britain’s policies. At the same time, given the importance of Australia 
and New Zealand to Dulles’s ‘united action’ plan, as well as the fact Britain increasingly saw 
the defence of Southeast Asia in Commonwealth terms, more could have been said with 
regards to Canberra and Wellington’s views. Additionally, in the final section of the 
Introduction as well as in the Conclusion the authors focus on the supposed links between 
Eden’s successful handling of the Indochina Crisis and his Suez debacle. Ruane and Jones 
correctly claim that only circumstantial evidence exists that Eden gained an exaggerated 
sense of Britain’s importance in 1954. Similarly, there is little indication that Dulles ‘stored 
up his resentment’ (p. 17) towards Eden until 1956 when he enacted his revenge through the 
US economic sanctions that compelled Britain to halt its military action. While this argument 
is intriguing, since the authors themselves admit that ‘this book has no remit to analyse the 
Suez Crisis or to seek to fathom why Eden decided “to go beserk about Nasser”’ (p. 260), 
these sections could have been excluded. Nevertheless, none of these issues detract from the 
overall quality of this timely and excellent monograph. 
 
Robert Barnes, York St John University 
